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Since the end of the Cold War, the debate on hu-manitarian interventions has gained strength. The legitimacy and legality of this kind of war have been brought into question. The argument presented in this paper is that even though the 
society of states is based on the sovereignty of its mem-
bers as an ordering principle, contributing generally to 
the achievement of common goals of states, sovereignty is 
only relevant as a mechanism to achieve the well-being of 
mankind as a whole, or what recently has been known as 
‘human security’. When this instrumental role is not being 
exercised responsibly or effectively and fundamental hu-
man rights are being disrespected in large-scale, humani-
tarian interventions can be justified in a society of states 
as long as the basic requirements of just cause, measure 
of last resort, proportionality and reasonable probability of 
success are satisfied.  
Humanitarian intervention is commonly defined as a 
“military action, employed without consent by a target so-
vereign state, to prevent or halt large-scale violence per-
petrated or permitted by its government” (Lu, 2005, p. 
188). This is a narrow definition since it limits its use in 
3 dimensions. With this definition, the term is not used 
to address ‘interventions’ that do not use force, such as 
diplomatic measures, economic sanctions, public state-
ments, etc. Since the term is used only to designate actions 
against or to prevent human rights abuses “perpetrated 
or permitted” by a government, actions to limit violence 
where there is no established government or in those cases 
in which the large-scale violence is perpetrated despite the 
government’s will and the measures taken by the state to 
control it are not comprehended. It also does not account 
for actions aimed at protecting or rescuing the intervening 
state’s own nationals. 
In order to discuss the justifiability of the humanita-
rian intervention, this definition may be useful, because it 
limits the term to the controversial actions. Actions that 
do not involve the use of force, actions permitted by the 
government of the state in which they will happen and ac-
tions to rescue the intervening state’s own nationals are less 
contentious than those comprehended by the definition. I 
would, however, complement the definition, with the ob-
jectives of this essay in mind, by adding the interventions 
that take place in situations of lawlessness. 
Fernando Tesón’s definition also includes these situa-
tions. According to him, “the situations that trigger huma-
nitarian intervention are acts such as crimes against hu-
manity, serious war crimes, mass murder, genocide, wides-
pread torture, and the Hobbesian state of nature (war of all 
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Even though the society of states is based on the 
sovereignty of its members as an ordering principle, 
sovereignty is only relevant as a mechanism to achieve the 
well-being of makind as a whole.
against all) caused by the collapse of social order” (Tesón, 
2005, p. 95).  The last situation mentioned by Tesón com-
prehends cases where there is no established government 
anymore (or it is so weak that cannot effectively protect its 
people). 
It is worthwhile to stress that there is an important di-
fference between the definition of humanitarian interven-
tion and the characterization of a legitimate humanitarian 
intervention. As argued by Lu, “the legitimacy of any kind 
of intervention in situations of humanitarian catastrophe, 
however, cannot be answered by labeling the action huma-
nitarian.” This label “does not automatically equal ‘ethical’ 
or ‘legitimate’” (Lu :189). Further qualifications are requi-
red.
Some scholars have argued that humanitarian interven-
tions can disturb the international order and the stability 
of the society of states. However, these are not undispu-
ted issues. Bull, who developed one of the most coherent 
accounts of international order, affirms that “the starting 
point of international relations is the existence of states, 
or independent political communities, each of which pos-
sesses a government, and asserts sovereignty in relation to 
a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a particular 
segment of the human population” (Bull, 1977, p. 8). He 
also argues that the international order is “a pattern of ac-
tivity that sustains the elementary and primary goals of the 
society of states” (Bull, 1977, p. 8). For Bull, the primary 
goal of the modern society of states is the preservation of 
the system itself. Other two goals that are elementary for 
this society but are subordinated to the first mentioned 
goal are the maintenance of the independence or external 
sovereignty (independence of outside authorities) of in-
dividual states and peace. Finally, he also categorizes the 
“limitation of violence”, the “keeping of promises” and the 
“stabilization of possessions” as primary goals of the in-
ternational society (Bull, 1977, pp. 16-19). Therefore, the 
society of states, according to Bull, is the arrangement of 
a group of states in a way that maximizes the achievement 
of its goals, being the primary one the preservation of the 
society of states itself. In this sense, it can be argued that, 
since the international society is based on sovereignty of 
its members and one of its primary goals is the protection 
of the external sovereignty of its members, humanitarian 
interventions have no room in a society of states, since 
they can, potentially, jeopardize the international order by 
violating its basis – the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention.
However, Bull, after defining world order as “patterns 
or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elemen-
tary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a 
whole”, argues that world order 
is something wider than order among states; some-
thing more fundamental and primordial than it; and 
also, I should argue, something morally prior to it. (…) 
It is order among all mankind which we must treat as 
being of primary value, not order within the society 
of states. If international order does have value, it can 
only be because it is instrumental to the goal of order 
in the human society as a whole (Bull, 1977, p. 22).
Therefore, when Bull discusses the international order, 
we can understand it as a description of the reality. But 
when he addresses moral concerns, he claim that the mo-
rally prior order is the one based on the well-being of indi-
vidual human beings and  on the goals of mankind. In this 
sense, it seems that Bull’s ethics of international relations 
reserve a place for humanitarian interventions, even thou-
gh its description of the modern 
international politics and inter-
national order does not and he 
criticizes arguments in favor of 
humanitarian interventions in 
a later writing. It is also impor-
tant to stress, however, that Bull 
wrote Anarchical Society in 1977 
and edited Intervention in World Politics in 1984, and as 
Wheeler argues, the end of the Cold War can be seen as a 
turning point in the history of the humanitarian interven-
tion legitimacy. For Wheeler, interventions before the end 
of the Cold War were partially justified on humanitarian 
grounds but greeted by international skepticism. But, in 
the 1990s, a new norm of U.N. Security Council-sanctio-
ned intervention was developed (Wheeler, 2000, p. 8).
Walzer, who defends the sovereignty as a mean of self-
determination, recognizes that “against the enslavement or 
massacre of political opponents, national minorities, and 
religious sects, there may well be no help unless help co-
mes from outside. And when a government turns savagely 
upon its own people, we must doubt the very existence of 
a political community to which the idea of self-determina-
tion might apply” (Walzer, 1992, p. 101). Tesón, a scholar 
presenting a liberal argument for intervention in anarchi-
cal or tyrannical conditions, argues that “anarchical con-
ditions prevent people, by reason of the total collapse of 
social order, from conducting meaningful life in common 
or pursuing individual plans of life” and “tyrannical condi-
tions prevent the victims, by the overuse of state coercion, 
from pursuing their autonomous projects” (Tesón, 2003, 
p. 97). Because sovereignty only has value because “it is 
instrumental to the goal of order in the human society as a 
whole” (Bull, 1977, p. 22), the state legitimacy and its right 
of non-intervention collapse in conditions of anarchy and 
tyranny. 
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In cases when the social arrangement in sovereign 
states is indeed threatening the protection of 
human life, the rationale for the respect for the 
principles on which this social organization is 
based ceases to exist. 
According to Owen, “to many, there is little doubt that 
(in and of itself) the traditional state-based security para-
digm is failing in its primary objective – to protect people.” 
(Owen, 2004, p. 374) This perception has led scholars to 
develop the concept of “human security” as an alternative 
to the traditional approach to international security based 
on the absence of wars between sovereign states.  Mack ar-
gues that 
In theory, states are responsible for protecting their 
citizens; in reality, they often violently repress them. 
Indeed, in the last one hundred years, far more people 
have died at the hands of their own governments than 
have been killed by foreign armies. (…) This is the pri-
mary reason why proponents of human security argue 
that the individual should be the referent object of se-
curity. (Mack, 2004, pp. 366-367).
As Alkire defines it, the “objective of human security 
is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from criti-
cal pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-
term human fulfillment.” (Alkire, 2001, p. 2)  This concept 
highlights the main objective of human life arrangement 
in society (which is not a new notion, since it dates at least 
as far as Hobbes’ writings): the protection of human life. 
In cases when the social arrangement in sovereign states is 
indeed threatening the achievement of this goal, the ratio-
nale for the respect for the principles on which this social 
organization is based ceases to exist.
Lu’s defense of “sovereignty as responsibility” – an al-
ternative view of sovereignty as an instrument to achieve 
the goal of order in the mankind as a whole – is drawn in 
similar lines. According to it, “‘sovereignty as responsibili-
ty’ highlights the international accountability of sovereigns 
for how they exercise that power, especially with respect 
to the protection of the human rights and humanitarian 
interests of their members.” In this sense, “the power of 
sovereigns to order their domestic realms” and the rule of 
non-intervention are only valid as ordering principle of 
the society of states as long the sovereigns empowered by 
it “exercise that power in ways that meet the basic human 
rights and humanitarian interests of their members” (Lu, 
2005, pp. 197-198). 
Once admitted the legitimacy of violations of the princi-
ples of sovereignty and non-intervention for humanitarian 
causes, it is necessary to analyze in which circumstances 
the humanitarian intervention can be seen as a “just war” 
or an action that contribute to the primary goal of pro-
tection of human life. Wheeler argues that there are four 
requirements that an intervention must meet to qualify as 
a justified humanitarian intervention: 
First, there must be a just cause, or what I prefer to 
call a supreme humanitarian emergency (…); secon-
dly, the use of force must be a last resort; thirdly, it 
must meet the requirement of proportionality; and, 
finally, there must be a high probability that the use 
of force will achieve a positive humanitarian outcome 
(Wheeler, 2000, pp. 33-34).
Evans and Sahnoun present some additional require-
ments. For them, “to justify military intervention, 6 princi-
ples have to be satisfied: 1. the just cause threshold, 2. right 
intention, 3. last resort, 4. proportional means, 5. reasona-
ble prospects, and 6. the requirement of right authority.” 
(Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p. 102) They argue that 
Military intervention for human protection purposes 
is an extraordinary measure. For it to be warranted, 
civilians must be faced with the threat of serious and 
irreparable harm in one of just two exceptional ways. 
The first is large-scale loss of life, actual or anticipated, 
with genocidal intent or not, which is the product of 
deliberate state action, state neglect, inability to act, or 
state failure. (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p. 102).
For Evans and Sahnoun, the primary purpose of a jus-
tified intervention must be “to halt or avert human suffe-
ring” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, p. 102). For Wheeler, in 
contrast, even though the intervention must have a hu-
manitarian cause in order to be justified, he argues that 
this does not have to be the primary motive, as long as the 
non-humanitarian motives do not undermine 
a positive humanitarian outcome (Wheeler, 
2000, p. 52). This line of reasoning is based on 
his consequentialist approach to the subject, 
according to which the intervention can still 
be considered justifiable as long as the results 
of the intervention in terms of humanitarian 
rescue are not jeopardized by the other mo-
tives of intervention (even if these other mo-
tives take precedence over the humanitarian 
motivation). Because primary purpose is so difficult to be 
accurately identified, it seems valid to judge the morali-
ty of the action on the basis of its consequences. The only 
problem with this consequetialist approach is that it only 
provides a moral verdict after the occurrence of the action 
and, therefore, does not provide a moral guidance for futu-
re actions. This is the raison d’être of establishing probabi-
lity of positive outcomes as a requirement for a legitimate 
humanitarian intervention. 
His third requirement concerns the rules of jus in 
bello: “the level of force employed should not exceed the 
harm that it is designed to prevent” (Wheeler, 2000, p. 
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35). Similarly, Evans and Sahnoun argue that “the scale, 
duration, and intensity of the planned military interven-
tion should be the minimum necessary to secure the de-
fined objective of protecting people” (Evans & Sahnoun, 
2002, p. 103).  They also agree that “there must be a reaso-
nable chance of success (…); the consequences of action 
should not be worse than the consequences of inaction” 
and that military action can be only justified “when the 
responsibility to prevent has been fully discharged” (Evans 
& Sahnoun, 2002, p. 102). But they recognize the problem 
of time pressure in humanitarian crisis and when they 
argue that intervention must be a last resort, they do not 
mean that all other alternative procedures available must 
be tried, but only those that have a reasonable chance of 
success, since in some cases the delay of military actions 
may have as consequence the loss of many lives (Wheeler, 
2000, p. 35, Evan & Sahnoun, 2002, p. 103).  
The last requirement presented by Evans and Sahnoun 
is probably one of the most controversial issues in the spe-
cialized literature. For them, the action must be approved 
by the UN, especially by the Security Council, to be con-
sidered legitimate, even if all the other requirements are 
fulfilled. They recognize the problems involved in consi-
dering the UN Security Council the ‘right authority’, such 
as the Council’s “uneven performance, its unrepresentative 
membership, and its inherent institutional double standar-
ds with the permanent-five veto powers”. However, they 
still defend it, because, for them, “those who challenge or 
evade the authority of the UN run the risk of eroding its 
authority in general and undermining the principle of a 
world order based on international law and universal nor-
ms” (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002, pp. 104-105).  On the other 
hand, Wheeler argues that “a practice of unilateral huma-
nitarian intervention can support a new solidarity in the 
society of states based on the reconciliation of the impera-
tives of order and justice” (Wheeler, 2000, p. 17).
Even though the legitimacy of a humanitarian inter-
vention is not eliminated by the lack of UN approval, the 
damage to UN authority caused by unilateral interven-
tions is well known after NATO intervention in Kosovo. 
One of the essentials problems about ‘judging’ a humani-
tarian intervention is that, even though “a new norm of 
UN-authorized humanitarian intervention developed in 
the 1990s” (Wheeler, 2000, p. 8) through a pattern of UN 
deliberations, the subject is still largely unregulated in the 
UN context, and most of the Security Council resolutions 
authorizing humanitarian interventions are based in a 
very loose interpretation of the UN Charter. Further regu-
lation of the subject, establishing well defined parameters 
for judgment in a consensual basis, would facilitate equal 
and fair assessments, and maybe even diminish some of 
the negative implications of power asymmetry in the UN 
for the evaluation. But, until clear rules are established, it 
is unreasonable to argue that lives should not be saved by 
humanitarian interventions that fulfill all legitimacy requi-
rements simply because of the inefficiency of the United 
Nations Security Council. 
I have argued in this essay that humanitarian interven-
tions comprehend military actions, taken up without the 
permission of the invaded state, to prevent or stop large-
scale violence perpetrated or per-
mitted by its government, or to 
reestablish order in a Hobbesian 
state of nature (lawlessness). 
Humanitarian interventions do 
not present a threat to order in 
a society of states because only 
those sovereigns that do not use 
its power in ways that meet the 
basic human rights of their members have their right to 
non-intervention invalidated, as a consequence of their 
own actions. In this context, I have argued in favor of the 
just war tradition requirements to qualify an intervention 
as a justified action. Humanitarian interventions are justi-
fiable in a society of states as long as they are a last resort to 
rescue people that are suffering with a ‘supreme humanita-
rian emergency’, meeting the requirement of proportiona-
lity in the use of force and having a reasonable probability 
of success. The humanitarian reason as a primary motive is 
not considered a requirement; humanitarian interventions 
that do not have humanitarian concerns as their primary 
motive can still be considered justified as long as the other 
requirements are met, especially the probably of positive 
outcomes. It was suggested that further regulation, espe-
cially within the UNSC, about humanitarian intervention 
and the institutionalization of evaluation tools for specific 
cases in the international level would provide more solid 
basis for judgment. Until then, innocent people should not 
be condemned to death because of the inefficiency of this 
forum in reestablishing security.  
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